

1 Jan 77

Attached is a copy of the "Consumer's Guide to the Intelligence Community" put together by [redacted] just before he took over as NIO for Africa. 25X1

It is intended for the new Administration and is very well done.

SA/DCE 25X1

[redacted] this is just great...!!!!!!

Thanks for showing it to me... GB 1-3-77

Date

FORM 101 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS

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
1-3-77

MEMORANDUM FOR: Deputy Director

Executive Registry

77-3066

Dave Grinwis, at the request of Brent Scowcroft, asked for a CIA assessment of Soviet intentions to test the new administration, particularly in regard to recent actions in East Germany. I have attached a copy of a memorandum responsive to that request which was conveyed to Dave this afternoon. A PDB on the subject is also being proposed.



SAYRE STEVENS
Deputy Director for Intelligence

Date 12 January 1977

FORM 5-75 101 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS

(EXECUTIVE)

*Transmitted
W.C.H. and [illegible]*

25X1

12 January 1977

Soviet - East German Actions in Berlin

The East Germans since the New Year have taken a series of actions aimed at unilaterally modifying the legal status of East Berlin, exploiting ambiguities in the terms of the Quadripartite Agreement of 1971. It is not clear that what the GDR has done is specifically banned by the Agreement. It seems likely, however, that the USSR has authorized the East German moves with a view to continuing to probe, in a low-keyed manner, the limits of Allied forbearance on the Berlin issue, and of Allied ability to coordinate a response during the transition between US administrations.

There have been three new East German actions taken:

-- Effective 1 January 1977, the passport regulations controlling travel between East and West Berlin were changed to require day visas for third-country travellers to East Berlin. These had not previously been required, and removed the main distinction between visa requirements for East Berlin and East Germany proper.

-- Also, sometime during the weekend of 1-2 January, the border control posts between East Berlin and East Germany were removed. This removed one of the last visible proofs of East Berlin's status as an entity legally distinct from East Germany.

-- In addition, on 11 January, East German police began barring access to the West German diplomatic representation in East Berlin to GDR citizens, who had been trooping there in large numbers to initiate emigration proceedings.

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These actions occurred against the backdrop of a number of other signs of a stiffening East German attitude. East German plainclothesmen had begun monitoring the FRG representation in mid-December, at about the same time that they had launched a crackdown against their own dissident intellectuals.

The East German motivation in initiating such actions seems clear. The GDR remains in many ways an artificial creation, and the loyalties of its citizenry are at best questionable. Any action which can widen the legal and psychological gulf between East and West Germany and bolster the East German state's claims to legitimacy are to its obvious advantage.

Soviet motivation in permitting the East Germans to act as they have is somewhat more difficult to reconcile with other Soviet interests. It was, after all, Soviet pressure which compelled the East Germans to regularize their relations with Bonn, and the Soviets retain a large stake in keeping the German problem quiescent as long as the broad outlines of their policy objectives in the West remain unchanged.

The Soviets, however, may regard the sort of nibbling actions the East Germans have engaged in as a low-risk gamble. It is striking that none of the East German actions have directly affected Allied rights or prerogatives, and it is highly unlikely that this is a fortuitous circumstance. Furthermore, the Soviets themselves have not taken any part in East German actions and can claim non-involvement. Finally, while the East German actions have violated the spirit of Four Power and inter-German understandings on Berlin, they do not yet appear to have violated the letter of any agreement. The Soviets may anticipate that it will be correspondingly difficult for the Allies to coordinate an effective response, particularly during a period when the American Government is in transition.

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25X1

TRANSMITTAL SLIP		DATE
TO 		
ROOM NO.	BUILDING	
REMARKS: <i>SA/DCI keeping attachment.</i>		
FROM: DCI		
ROOM NO.	BUILDING	EXTENSION

FORM NO. 241
1 FEB 55

REPLACES FORM 36-J
WHICH MAY BE USED.

(47)